Last weekend, the Associated Press released a study of ten drone strikes in Pakistan in the last 18 months. This is the most ambitious journalistic investigation of drones so far, which also does what the Obama administration has so far failed to do:  to meaningfully investigate claims of civilian casualties and publicly evaluate why those killed were targeted.

The study found that at least 138 militants were killed, while the remaining 56 were civilians and tribal police. It is difficult to extrapolate much from ten cases. But if the same pattern held true for other strikes, the civilian casualty rate would be far less than is commonly asserted in Pakistani public discourse -- but also far higher than the Obama Administration has suggested previously. Senior counterterrorism official John Brennan has in the past suggested the civilian casualty rate was zero, whereas President Obama has described it as "few." In contrast, Pakistani public discourse often suggests that most casualties of drone strikes are civilians. The AP article quotes prominent Pakistani public figure Imran Khan on drones: "Those who lie to the nation after every drone attack and say terrorists were killed should be ashamed."

The coverage of the AP study so far (and even the headline of the story itself) has largely focused on the discrepancy between the AP's finding that mostly militants were killed in the drone strikes it examined, and the common assertion in Pakistani media and politics that drones are primarily killing innocent civilians. Inflated civilian casualty claims due to drones are certainly a problem in Pakistan. They not only distort public discourse and policy-making, but they also inhibit sound analysis of what is causing civilian casualties, and possible steps to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in the future. However, reading the AP reporting as only exposing the hot air behind bogus civilian casualty claims misses the real contribution this study makes to the overall debate about drones.

The AP study is novel because it is based on something more substantial than the whispers of anonymous officials in the halls of Islamabad and Washington. AP took the time (and risk) to actually speak to those who knew the individuals killed, who saw the strike take place, and in some cases buried family members.

What's more, contrary to those who suggest that any ground reports will be hopelessly compromised by propaganda and anti-American bias, what the villagers interviewed told the AP smacks of truthfulness. If the local villagers were motivated to lie to inflate civilian casualties—as one of the anonymously cited intelligence officials in the AP story seems to suggest—they certainly gave AP the wrong impression. According to the 80 villagers AP interviewed, militants were the only victims in six of the ten strikes examined.

And while the AP found that militants were killed more frequently than civilians, it did find civilian casualties in a number of strikes. This begs the question: if the AP is doing assessments like this, why isn't the U.S. government? To the best of our knowledge, U.S. review of drone strikes consists of video footage before, during, and after the incident. For example, following one strike in which AP found that three women and two children were killed, the anonymous intelligence officials' rebuttal was that women and children had not been observed prior to the strike.  Certainly no public investigations of drone strike cases—of the type that typically follow allegations of civilian casualties by the U.S. military in Afghanistan—have been forthcoming.

This is problematic because, while video surveillance can be an aide to investigation, it often presents an incomplete picture. Even with the best intelligence in the world, the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan is murky, as are the activities and affiliation of individuals operating within it. Across the border in Afghanistan, where troops have years of experience with the terrain and the communities, and greater field intelligence and access, mistakes are regularly made. The Administration's claims that such mistakes are almost impossible to avoid, or its attempts to dismiss claims to the contrary as propaganda alone, willfully disregards all the military has learned in its past ten years in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition, video surveillance is often not enough to determine who is a civilian or who is a combatant under international law. Under international law, members of an armed group that is party to the conflict, or civilians who directly participate in hostilities can be directly targeted. While there are ongoing international legal debates about what constitutes "direct participation," the provision of food, shelter or medical care to one of the parties to a conflict, or mere association with one warring party does not constitute participation.

In Afghanistan, our organization, Open Society Afghanistan, has had more access to investigate such cases, and found that civilians have sometimes been killed or detained because their proximity to insurgent groups led to a sort of "guilt by association." Studies like the AP report raise concerns that the United States may be applying the same broad standards for direct participation in Pakistan. In one strike documented by the AP, 38 civilians and tribal police were reportedly killed at a public jirga—a level of civilian harm that U.S. intelligence officials disputed on the grounds that "the group targeted was heavily armed, some of its members were connected to al-Qaida," according to the article. The AP analysis of the incident based on villagers' accounts found that some militants were present but that the majority was comprised of civilians, tribal elders, and tribal police—many of whom may well have been armed given the cultural context and insecurity in Waziristan.

The lack of transparency in the Obama's Administrations' drone policy have made it impossible to know how the U.S. government chooses its targets in any given incident, and thus difficult to get any real traction on important questions of civilian harm.  The Obama Administration's response to such concerns has ranged from outright denial to mere assertions that its strikes comply with international law (for example, in speeches by Legal Advisor Harold Koh and counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan). In a recent chat forum, President Obama dismissed the potential civilian harm from drones, as "not huge" concerns and assured those on the chat room that the U.S. use of drones was "judicious" and not "willy-nilly." Such remarks were the most candid, but also disturbingly casual in addressing these critical concerns.

The AP's findings starkly illustrate where the Obama Administration is falling short on public accountability for civilian casualties. At the same time, reaction to the AP report demonstrates how the debate over the percentage of civilian casualties can distract attention from equally critical issues, specifically the complete lack of transparency and how the U.S. distinguishes between militants and civilians.  The Administration's closeted response to serious public concerns about its drone program does not befit its stated democratic values.  Given the prominence of drones to U.S. national security policy, and the demonstrated consequences of these strikes, we need to move beyond the "willy-nilly" standard of killing.

If the Taliban came to your house in the night, fully armed, and demanded food, would you feed them? You may have no choice. This does not make you a combatant. But it can leave you at risk of another visit in the night and detention by U.S. special operations forces.

In the last year, the U.S. military, together with its NATO partners, have dramatically increased the use of night raids, which includes night-time search, seizure, and (less commonly) kill operations. My organization, the Open Society Foundations, has released a report on night raids, together with our Afghan partner, The Liaison Office. While the report found significant improvements in the conduct of night raids, it suggests that these improvements may be outweighed by a growing toll on Afghan civilians, including an increasing number of civilians being detained on the raids.

Night raids have increased five-fold from February 2009 until the end of 2010. Statistics are not regularly released publicly but at their peak this summer, there may have been as many as 40 night raids in a single night in Afghanistan.

International military argue night raids are their most effective tools in disrupting insurgent networks. While individual night raids are unquestionably effective at getting insurgent leaders - with ever greater accuracy, our report agreed - the larger costs of night raids may outweigh the benefits.

Some military officials and analysts we interviewed suggested the targeted kill-capture campaign cannot hope to put the same pressure on insurgents as it did in Iraq because high level leaders can always flee to Pakistan. The bulk of the insurgents left in Afghanistan are low level fighters, easily replaced in a population that is continually inflamed against international forces by tactics like night raids.

Worse, our report suggests that many of those detained in night raids may be non-combatants, including those who are guilty only of providing food or shelter under duress. Civilians with tribal or family connections to insurgents, with possible information about insurgent activities, are frequently detained.

As one international official admitted to us: "If you can't get the guy you want, you get the guy that knows him." This is not only strategically unsound - it may result in ambiguous intelligence gains at the cost of high community outrage - but it raises legal concerns of potential indiscriminate detention. Further, once detained, even for brief periods of time, these non-combatants may suffer poor conditions, or even abuse when detainees are transferred to Afghan prisons where torture is widely used.

The human cost of night raids is not limited to detainees. Because these operations primarily target Afghan homes, or entire villages, civilians are inevitably affected. International forces have made many tactical and policy changes in the last year to reduce civilian casualties, among other important reforms. But with the number of raids that go on in Afghanistan, civilian casualties are inevitable.

Although most night raids are designed to capture, not kill, and significant efforts have been put into reducing the risk of civilian casualties, these are still among the most kinetic, most violent operations conducted by international military in Afghanistan. They can result in lasting trauma among communities subjected to them, and lasting ire against international forces and the Afghan government.

A former Special Forces commander suggested to me that he still has nightmares about night raids - and he wasn't on the receiving end.

By relying on night raids as their primary tool, special operations forces are driving the conflict into more and more people's homes. When those homes belong to civilians, not Taliban, it is surely counter-productive. Not only does it create enormous immediate human costs for Afghan communities, but it is exacerbating political tensions with the Afghan government.

The issue of night raids is one of the key stumbling blocks in developing a U.S.-Afghan partnership agreement. The Afghan government has long objected to night raids, but it has been pushed to its limit by the ramp up in night raids in the last year. Not seeing the security gains that the U.S. military has promised, fearful that these night raids may compromise its reconciliation efforts, and tired of blowback from an angry public, the Afghan government is standing firm on this issue and as a result U.S. long-term security operations may be compromised in Afghanistan.

The best move for the U.S. at this point is to ensure that only senior insurgents are targeted on raids, and to seek to reduce the number of night raids in favor of alternative detention methods. No one is arguing that suspected combatants should not be detained, or even that those with information on insurgent activities might be questioned. But night raids should be one of many tools in the box, not the default means for detention, particularly when non-combatants are involved or likely to be present.

International military argue that switching to other detention means, such as "day raids" would allow the individual to get away or might result in a firefight that would be dangerous to both troops and civilians present. While this may be true in some situations, in many of the night raids we have documented other methods of detention were clearly available. In late 2010, the homes of two Al Jazeera journalists in two provinces were raided at night, despite that both of them had press passes and regularly went to U.S. military bases when called.

Alternative detention mechanisms should be especially emphasized in more stable areas of Afghanistan, where the government has control and where regular law enforcement options are available. In many areas of Afghanistan, particularly urban areas, the Afghan government regularly detains individuals, many of them dangerous terrorists, without having to resort to "black op" levels of force.

Our report's conclusions point the U.S. and NATO to what they already appear to know, but do not put into practice. The U.S. and NATO's own operational guidance (tactical directives) require that alternatives to night raids are sought. If they were to follow their own rules they might quickly find that from the village to the Palace, Afghan anger at the international military would quickly dissipate.

This week Afghan president Hamid Karzai kicked off the Afghan fighting season with strong words, not for the Taliban, but for his international allies. On Tuesday Karzai demanded that international forces halt airstrikes on Afghan homes, or leave. "From this moment, airstrikes on the houses of people are not allowed," Karzai announced at a press conference.  Karzai accused international forces of acting like occupiers, rather than allies, and implied that if their demands on civilian casualties were not heeded Afghans would respond with force. "[H]istory is a witness how Afghanistan deals with occupiers," Karzai said.

Karzai has a reputation for emotional outbursts and erratic behavior, but this was neither. It is no coincidence that this ultimatum comes in the midst of long-term strategic partnership discussions with the U.S., and at the beginning of the summer slated for the first U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Civilian casualties are a constant source of public outrage, and a personal tragedy for the victims involved.

But they also represent the costs of the current U.S. and NATO military strategy of more aggressive operations against suspected insurgent networks, a strategy that Karzai thinks is undermining his appeals for peace. The less convinced Karzai is that this strategy will work, the less the Afghan government is willing tolerate the human costs of accelerated kill/capture operations. For now, he remains unconvinced, and so civilian casualties have risen from a public irritant to a potential roadblock in the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership.

The immediate event that precipitated Karzai's statements was an airstrike in Helmand province on Saturday that reportedly killed 14 civilians, two women and 12 children. This followed a string of prominent civilian casualty incidents in the last few months. In two separate episodes in the past week, in southeastern Khost and northern Takhar provinces, five civilians were reportedly killed in night raids. Earlier this month in eastern Nangarhar province, an Afghan National Police officer and his 12-year-old niece were killed in a night raid. An errant helicopter strike in March 2011 in Kunar province resulted in the killing of nine boys (made worse by ISAF  mishandling the incident). A separate strike in the same area in February 2011 was alleged to have killed 65 civilians. The list goes on.

Afghan anger over civilian casualties has been a long-standing issue. Despite considerable efforts to reduce civilian harm over the past two years, civilian casualties still dominate Afghan critiques of international forces. Public demonstrations, often large, and often violent, are common following international military operations that result in alleged civilian harm. Following the night raid in Takhar province, more than 2000 Afghans engaged in a multi-day protest, with some attempting to storm the local international military base. Whereas international forces were welcomed in 2001, they are now frequently compared to Russian occupying troops, to criminal actors, or the Taliban—often less favorably, according to a 2010 study of Afghan perceptions by my organization, Open Society Foundations. The study found that Civilian casualties, mistreatment during detention operations, and lack of accountability when these incidents occurred have played an important part in shaping those declining attitudes toward international forces.

Beginning in late 2008, international military officials found that the backlash over civilian casualties had risen to such a level that it was undermining the broader counterinsurgency strategy, creating a potent propaganda and recruiting tool for insurgents and sapping support for the international military-backed Afghan government. Tactical directives were issued to restrict practices with a high risk of civilian casualties or outrage. Certain operations, including airstrikes, were scaled back.

But these tactical and operational restrictions were a piecemeal approach. International forces focused on the numbers of civilian casualties, but did little to address other factors feeding into the anger they caused amongst Afghans. Airstrikes, the leading cause of civilian death by international forces, decreased, but the rate of night raids, which cause an equal amount of outrage, has increased five times from what it was at the beginning of 2009.

Few meaningful efforts were made to address weak accountability for international troop conduct, which feeds into Afghan government concerns about sovereignty violations and public perceptions that international forces kill with impunity. And though civilian casualties caused by international forces decreased, those by insurgent groups skyrocketed. This not only undermined Afghan confidence in the overall strategy, but perversely increased blowback for international forces. Afghans expect that international forces will not only avoid harming them, but also will protect them from insurgents.  Repeated failure to do so leads to disenchantment, and suspicion of international motives.

As a result of these factors, hostility to international troops is higher than ever, as is Karzai's frustration over the issue. A Pew research poll found that from November 2009 to November 2010, the number of Afghans who believed that attacks against international forces were justified jumped from 8% to 27%.  Though public opinion polls show that a majority of Afghans still want international forces in Afghanistan, disenchantment is increasing. Karzai's comments about treating U.S. and NATO allies like other past invaders may sound shocking, but these statements are common across Afghanistan, from Friday sermons to the halls of Parliament to community jirgas.

Karzai, like many Afghans, would prefer that the U.S. focus on Pakistan, where most key insurgent leaders take shelter, instead of increasing operations in Afghanistan. Many Afghans fear that the current emphasis on kill/capture missions is not only misplaced and risky for civilians but also undermines the potential for peaceful negotiations to happen at either a local or national level. Karzai views the fact that the U.S. continues to ignore these concerns, and his repeated protests, as a violation of Afghan sovereignty.

Karzai's fundamental demands—a halt to unilateral strikes, particularly in the form of night raids and airstrikes—are largely non-negotiable issues for the U.S. The Obama Administration has made clear that it reserves the right to target those it considers to be a significant threat wherever they are found, just as it has done in Pakistan. With little wiggle room on this fundamental issue, the U.S. is heading towards a relationship with Afghanistan's government that is as strained as the relationship with Pakistan.

The U.S. can offer to scale back offensive operations, or try to involve the Afghan government more in the authorization of particular operations (as it tried with night raids after Karzai took a similarly aggressive public position on those operations this past November). However, as illustrated above, these tactical and operational approaches have been ineffective at addressing Afghan concerns because they skirt the more fundamental strategy divide between Karzai and his U.S. allies. Unless the U.S. does a better job of tailoring these tactical and operational restraints to Afghan political and strategic concerns, the impasse will endure.

A Global Post report last week found that not only did recent U.S. airstrikes in Kunar province, Afghanistan, kill as many as 67 civilians, but also that some journalists were prevented from investigating what happened. Jean MacKenzie reported that two Al Jazeera reporters were detained and interrogated by the U.S. military for covering the incident.

Though both journalists were released within a day, and there was no permanent damage to the material or equipment confiscated, the incident is the latest in a trend toward government or military actions interfering with independent investigation and coverage of the Afghan conflict.

Afghanistan has among the strongest freedom of speech guarantees in the region. The freedom and development of media in the country is often considered one of the few unqualified successes since the 2001 invasion.

More recently, though, journalists working on conflict-related issues have faced increasing harassment, coercion, and even serious threats by all parties to the conflict. Journalists, particularly Afghan journalists, may be subject to detention and questioning, and even reprisals for simply doing their job.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups have often threatened or targeted journalists and human rights monitors who have reported on their abuses or attacks. International military do not overtly threaten harm; however, they have contributed to the eroding media space through their own lack of transparency (as seen in their recent handling of the Kunar incident), and by detaining local journalists or monitors based on their work activities.

In addition to two Al Jazeera journalists detained in Kunar last week, another two Al Jazeera journalists were detained by international military forces in separate night raid operations in September 2010. In one of the cases, the journalist was targeted because he shot footage of violence on election day. Though this would seem to be a basic part of local journalism coverage in Afghanistan, ISAF accused him of being an insurgent propagandist.

The greatest pressure on free speech recently, though, has come from the Afghan government. I myself experienced these restrictions during recent research into nighttime search and seizure ("night raids") by international military in eastern Afghanistan. Together with an international journalist and an Afghan journalist, I was interviewing an affected family in a public hospital when we were told to stop our interview. Interviewing victims in a hospital is a sensitive issue, so we would have completely understood had we been asked to stop because it was disturbing other patients, inhibiting medical treatment or recovery, or potentially politicizing the otherwise neutral hospital space. However, none of these objections were raised.

Instead, we were told that we had to stop the interview because only the National Directorate of Security and the governor of the province could authorize us to speak to someone about an incident involving international military. In a phone conversation to the hospital administrator (which was repeated to us), the governor said we had to stop the interview because there had been no incident; no bombing; and no one was harmed—an Orwellian explanation directly contradicted by the wounded patients sitting before us, and their testimony.

The Afghan government has been sensitive about potentially negative portrayals of violence and instability in the country, but often these have been directed at insurgent-related violence. In the run-up to the 2009 presidential elections, the Afghan government banned coverage of any suicide bombings or other violence on election day, but most journalists, at least in the capital city of Kabul, disregarded the warning. The Afghan National Directorate of Security reportedly told Afghan journalists not to report live from the scene of an insurgent attack in 2010, a warning that was later retracted by President Karzai's office after it received strong criticism.

The Afghan journalist who was with us at the hospital said he was often prevented from reporting on incidents and that he been beaten in the past for taking pictures after a civilian casualty incident. In his experience, local officials were most likely to stop him or get violent for incidents involving international forces. "The governor is working for American forces so he does not like such things to be publicized," was his explanation.

In the situation at the hospital, I do not think the international military had any knowledge that we were interviewing casualties resulting from their operations or that the governor tried to interfere with those investigations. But ISAF's general attitude toward transparency—namely, its lack thereof—and its habit of treating journalists who are doing their job as suspected insurgents creates an enabling environment for media censorship.

Free speech—and more importantly open reporting—is crucial during this difficult time in Afghanistan's transition. Actions speak louder than words: The detention of journalists for trying to provide an independent voice on security incidents undermines Western governments' otherwise positive efforts to support free media in Afghanistan in the past 10 years.

A Senate Armed Services Committee report released Friday found that many Afghans subcontracted to guard U.S. bases have links to the Taliban or criminal networks. Many of these individuals are accused of serious abuses against civilians, including murder, robbery, kidnapping, and bribery. Lack of oversight in the hiring and conduct of these guards has serious consequences not only for troop and base security, but also for key elements of the current international strategy.

For the last year, the Afghanistan war strategy has tried to deprive insurgents of the support of the Afghan population by addressing key grievances -- including corruption and civilian casualties. International forces have restricted tactics leading to civilian deaths, provided greater transparency and rights protection for detainees, tried to reduce corruption through their Afghan partnerships, and revamped the operational culture to be more sensitive to Afghan concerns.

Despite this progress, the conduct and accountability of those international forces work with -- like those noted in the Senate Armed Services Committee report -- has remained poor. This misses the core of Afghan complaints. Afghans who are angry about civilian casualties caused by international forces are not just concerned about airstrikes or night-time kill-and-capture raids. They are also upset about harm caused when international forces or intelligence units subcontract security responsibilities to local actors without sufficient oversight and accountability for their actions.

My organization, the Open Society Foundations, recently released a report examining Afghan attitudes toward warring parties. Most Afghans we spoke to blamed international forces equally, or even more, than insurgents for civilian casualties and other abuses, and for the continued escalation of the conflict. Many suspected international forces of directly or indirectly aiding insurgents or other criminal groups.

Given the findings of the Senate Armed Services Committee report, it is not hard to see why. When U.S.-employed base guards commit extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, or other harassment of the local population with no consequences, the local community holds the U.S. responsible. As one man I interviewed from Kandahar alleged, "The international troops are the source of illegal activities. Narcotics smuggling, bombing, suicide attacks, everything goes back to international military forces. They are also instigating fighting between tribes."

The negative perceptions that develop from this guilt-by-association have far-reaching consequences for U.S. policies in Afghanistan. Local communities surrounding military bases have likely long known about the activities documented by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Resentment and anger at international forces -- that they allowed such behavior to take place and then allowed it to continue -- undermines progress on winning "hearts and minds" or persuading these communities to support the Afghan government and the international coalition's efforts. It has also likely sandbagged other efforts toward building rule of law, anti-corruption and good governance in these communities, which would appear to be directly contradicted by U.S. support for criminal actors and warlords who are never held accountable for their crimes. In Afghanistan, like anywhere else, actions speak louder than words.

Further, the fact that international forces keep promising more security and stability, but then support members of the Taliban or other criminal militias (whether knowingly or not) makes Afghans doubt their motives in Afghanistan. A woman from southeastern Khost province told me, "In my opinion, the American forces themselves want to create insurgency for their own interest. Because, if there is peace in the country, then the people will tell them that there is no need for the international forces to stay in the country. That is why they have let the insurgency increase."

Such statements are exaggerated, likely influenced by propaganda and inherent mistrust of foreigners. But, these statements also contain an important grain of truth, and a warning for continued engagement in Afghanistan.

The Senate Armed Services committee recommended stronger accountability: "We need to shut off the spigot of U.S. dollars flowing into the pockets of warlords and power brokers who act contrary to our interests and contribute to the corruption that weakens the support of the Afghan people for their government."

Calls for greater accountability on the part of US forces, intelligence actors, and their Afghan counterparts, have often been treated as a second-order priority by military and civilian officials. But the perceived impunity of these actors are central to Afghan suspicions about international engagement in Afghanistan. Addressing these concerns is critical for the current policies in Afghanistan to succeed.

A big revelation from Bob Woodward's new book Obama's Wars is that the CIA maintains a 3,000-strong Afghan paramilitary force that conducts cross-border operations into Pakistan. Though news to the U.S. public, these abusive paramilitary forces are unfortunately far too well known to many Afghan civilians.

As a human rights researcher in Afghanistan for the last two years, I have found that some of the worst behavior toward civilians comes from these CIA paramilitary forces. Civilians described how these groups, often called "campaign forces," used disproportionate and indiscriminate force, throwing grenades or firing into homes without provocation during night-time house raids. Those who were detained by these paramilitary forces described being beaten, gun-butted, or otherwise abused.

Many civilians believe that assassinations and targeted killings that are publicly blamed on NATO forces or insurgents are actually carried out by these paramilitary forces. In the most publicized incident to date, these paramilitary forces attacked the police headquarters in Kandahar city, killing the chief of police.

Former detainees frequently report semi-permanent detention facilities at the campaign force bases. Given the secrecy surrounding these forces, verifying any of these claims is nearly impossible. Although significant reforms have been made to improve the transparency of U.S. detention practices, the detention practices of these rogue forces, like the rest of their conduct, is a black hole.

Communities are terrified of these forces, given their fierce reputation and the lack of any consequences for their actions. I spoke with a community elder who said he approached campaign forces about the whereabouts of a community member who was detained by them in a night raid. In response, the forces threatened that he or the man detained would be killed or taken away to Guantanamo Bay "forever." Similar threats were made to others who made requests for information following campaign force detentions.

Though confirmation that the CIA supports these groups is news to the American public, Afghans have long known about these forces and associated them with the U.S. The fact that forces employed by the U.S. are allowed to behave this way without repercussion exacerbates Afghan mistrust of U.S. intentions.

Woodward's book does not describe the lines of authority, if any, over these forces. One of the few snapshots on how the Obama Administration views these forces is a spring 2010 conversation in which proponents of a more limited, troop-lite, counterterrorism strategy noted with satisfaction that these paramilitary forces were able to continue to hunt insurgents even in areas with little U.S. troop support. At least based on Woodward's account, there appears to be little discussion over whether these forces might be harming the broader civilian population, a cause for concern on both a moral and a strategic level.

Counterinsurgency is premised on denying insurgent forces local support by addressing the grievances. Two key grievances that have turned Afghans toward the Taliban are civilian casualties caused by international forces and abuses of power by the Afghan government. US-supported paramilitary death squads who kill and abuse civilians with impunity give the Taliban a potent propaganda tool, and make it difficult to instill in Afghan officials the importance of accountability.

Woodward describes the shock and, often, disgust, of incoming Obama officials upon learning about past U.S. rendition practices, rough interrogation methods, and other tools of the War on Terror. Significant efforts have been made to restrict such practices, to reduce civilian harm in Afghanistan, and to improve detention practices. Given those reforms, it should be unacceptable for a branch of the U.S. government to hire armed thugs in Afghanistan to kill, threaten, torture, and abuse Afghan and Pakistani citizens under the barely plausible deniability of U.S. authority.

Many mistakes were made in the name of security shortly after September 11, from rendition of terror suspects to horrific treatment at Abu Ghraib. But as these practices became known, the American public said no to U.S. involvement in this type of gloves-off behavior. Outsourcing abuse to unaccountable Afghan militias is no different. The U.S. must hold all forces under its watch in Afghanistan to the same moral standard: to establish stability and peace and protect civilians, not terrorize them.

In my last two years as a human rights lawyer in Afghanistan, I've been privy to many debates about civilian casualty numbers. By my last count, there are at least eight entities working in Afghanistan that track civilian casualties. None of them ever seem to agree on an annual number, or even the numbers harmed in any given incident. Civilian casualties have become such a crucial political concern that questions over whose numbers are the right ones are almost always contentious. I was once subjected to a 45-minute lecture about the meaning of "truth," when I asked an Isaf officer for their estimated civilian death toll of one large airstrike.

Now the Taliban wants in. This week, the Taliban reacted to the UN's new statistics on civilian harm with a proposal for a joint committee to investigate civilian casualty allegations. The UN report, which covered the first six months of 2010, attributed 76% of civilian harm to the Taliban and other insurgent groups and only 12% to pro-government forces, which includes international and Afghan forces.

A Taliban spokesman rejected these statistics as Western media propaganda, arguing that the UN had ignored many civilian casualties caused by airstrikes and other tactics used by international forces (despite the many UN reports and releases on just these topics). Zabiullah Mujahid, the spokesman, proposed a joint committee comprising of representatives from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, UN human rights investigators, NATO and the Taliban to investigate civilian harm.

It's hard to take such a proposal seriously, given the Taliban's past record on civilian harm. Though the Taliban dismissed the UN report as a product of western media bias, many other Afghan writers and monitors have flagged the rise in insurgent attacks with concern, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (PDF) and the Afghan Rights Monitor. Suicide attacks and roadside mines, which disproportionately harm civilians even where there is a legitimate military target, have increased dramatically. Even more chilling has been the spike in targeted killings – averaging 18 per week in the last two months, compared to just over three per week at this time last year.

While the Taliban happily claims ownership for many deadly and disproportionate attacks, they are not responsible for all of these incidents. Other insurgent groups, warlords and criminal networks are responsible for their share of suicide attacks and civilian killings.

The other concern, if one were to take such a proposal seriously, would be the standards used to investigate civilian casualty incidents. Though differences exist, the UN and Nato at least have a basic common understanding of what constitutes civilian harm and what is called for under international law to protect civilians. Despite this, they strongly disagree on numbers of civilian casualties and the UN has never agreed to Isaf proposals for joint investigations and findings.

In contrast, the Taliban has a fundamentally different view of who is a civilian to the UN, other international human rights monitors and many Islamic scholars, for that matter. The Taliban regularly kills or threatens local officials, parliamentary candidates, those working with the UN and international agencies, teachers or pro-government mullahs and others who would be considered civilians under international law. The tragi-comic suggestion by one Afghan monitoring group, the Afghan Rights Monitor – that the Taliban would have to agree not to kill the investigating committee – highlights the absurdity of negotiating common definitions given such fundamental differences.

Yet the opportunity for dialogue is the one redeeming nugget in this proposal. While leading officials at the recent international donors' conference in Kabul or the Afghan government-led Peace Jirga paid lip service to human rights and civilian protection, it is unclear if these issues will be redlines in dialogue with the Taliban or other insurgent groups in proposed reconciliation discussions. This is all the more surprising given that civilian protection has been the one issue the Afghan public has made clear is a deal-breaker for them – as demonstrated by both the Taliban's and Isaf's sensitivity to this issue. It's an issue that neither side can ignore, and if that generates a franker dialogue about how to address civilian concerns, then that's not such a bad idea, after all.

Despite all the public relations bickering over numbers and statistics, it appears that the political priority of civilian casualties is the one thing that all sides agree on.

With General Stanley McChrystal's ouster, his successor General David Petraeus has suggested that he will review specific tactical restraints, even though the overall strategy and direction of the Afghanistan war will remain the same. As he begins his review, the tactics General Petraeus should consider revising are not those tactics that General McChrystal put in place to protect civilians but those that continue to show indifference to their harm and outrage.

In 2009, General McChrystal instituted changes to military tactics that resulted in greater overall civilian protection and fewer civilian casualties. These changes have been controversial. General McChrystal argued that building community support in the long term was more important to the overall effort and to overall troop safety than the short term gain of shooting at an insurgent and causing civilian harm, which would lead to more insurgent support.

Troops have rightfully been concerned that what is lost in the trade off is their immediate short term safety. But in most cases, it's not clear that loosening the restrictions that General McChrystal put in place would help their immediate safety. The number one threat to troops today is IEDs, followed by suicide attacks. Rarely would the restrictions on airstrikes and hasty fire prevent troops from defending against these types of threats. The majority of the time, by the time troops find out about the threat, the insurgent who was responsible is either long gone or already dead. Instead, General McChrystal knew that you stop these threats through good intelligence and trust among the community. You can't get that by killing or terrorizing innocent civilians in the community.

As General Petraeus takes over command in Afghanistan, he needs to revamp the overall practice of night raids. While many of the tactics that General McChrystal instituted have had an impact on civilian protection, the one exception is the extremely inflammatory practice of night raids. Today in Kabul, more than 300 citizens protested against another night raid conducted by international military forces. Shouting slogans of hatred for international forces, the protests soon turned violent as those in the crowd threw stones at Afghan security officials trying to restrain them.

Today's protests are not an exception: night raids have long been one of the biggest complaints of Afghan civilians. More than 98 civilians were killed in night raids in 2009 (and many times that number detained or harmed) in these night-time house searches. These search and seizure operations are often accompanied by heavy use of force. In a night raid a few months ago, an elderly man was shot in his bed by US forces. Further, beyond actual harm, the raids are extremely offensive to Afghan culture.

The Afghan home, and the women of the family in it, are considered sacrosanct. Breaking into houses at night and invading this privacy is one of the most culturally abusive things troops could do in Afghanistan. It only takes one night raid to undermine years of tactical restraint and goodwill-building measures. One Afghan from Khost pointed out to me, "If someone is handcuffed in front of women, he would see no other way left, but to head towards the mountains [to fight with the insurgents]."

Recognizing how much night raids clashed with the "hearts and minds" premise of counterinsurgency, General McChrystal put in place new tactical restrictions in January designed to set the bar higher for authorizing these raids, restricting certain conduct, and increasing accountability. But it's not clear that these have had much impact. The number of night raids went up --not down-- under his command, according to officials I've spoken to. And a raid in February that killed three women under suspicious circumstances was only investigated after journalists and human rights monitors raised the issue publicly.

No one yet knows how the change in leadership of the Afghanistan mission will impact the lives of civilian and soldiers on the ground. The strategy General McChrystal instituted in Afghanistan was modeled after General Petraeus's strategy in Iraq and General Petraeus will likely keep in place many of the restrictions reducing civilian harm. But it's less clear what he will do about night raids. As head of central command, he retained control over many of the night raids operations over the past year. Some sources suggest that the increase in night raid operations has been more due to these operations than those coming under General McChrystal's authority.

The change in leadership is an opportunity to revamp past tactics or choices that weren't working. But if so, it needs to be done for all practices, from troop restraints to black ops to troop positioning. When it comes to counterinsurgency strategy, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Applying a counterinsurgency lens to some aspects (like air strikes or direct fire) but not to other aspects (like night raids or overall accountability) is self-defeating. Otherwise the protests and the outrage we saw today will keep coming, and so will new insurgent recruits. And that doesn't make anyone safer--not civilians, nor troops.

Recently I was in Kandahar, the city at the epicenter of the conflict in Afghanistan, for a week of field research. I spoke with many Afghan civilians, those directly affected and those not, to get a sense of their views of the different warring parties, and their attitudes toward the upcoming US and NATO offensive in Kandahar. Though military and governmental officials wax optimistic that this offensive will turn the tide in Afghanistan, those I spoke to feared it would only lead to more civilian harm in a city already ravaged by years of conflict.

The testing ground for what a counterinsurgency-style offensive should look like is taking place in Marjah right now. There is every evidence that despite difficult circumstances, Afghan and international troops in Marjah are taking seriously restrictions on tactics that might cause civilians harm or imperil future plans for stabilizing and "holding" the area. Strangely though, the fact that they're taking this so seriously has been a cause for some concern back in the States.

Just as progress is being made in reducing the civilian casualties that created such public backlash against international forces in Afghanistan, public commentary has focused on how counterinsurgency-driven restrictions on  airstrikes or other tactics might also be complicating force protection. Reports from embedded journalists have shared troop frustrations at requirements like 72 hour surveillance on a compound before it can be bombed, or not firing on unarmed Afghans, even if they suspect those individuals were insurgents who  simply dropped their weapons moments before. Some opinion pieces and roundtables have worried that the restrictions put international troops at greater risk because they cannot fightback with everything they have.

No one would argue that protecting coalition troops is anything but a top priority. Yet in the vast majority of situations in Afghanistan,it's not an either/or situation. Tactical restrictions that protect civilians go hand in hand with protecting troops. The number one killer of civilians and troops alike continues to be insurgent suicide attacks and roadside bombs, the risk of which the unrestricted use of artillery and airpower can do almost nothing to reduce. What might make a difference is better relations with local Afghan communities, who might be able to warn of such attacks or, if sufficiently supported, prevent insurgents from operating in their areas. The trust and confidence it would take to build those relationships, though, can only be earned by demonstrating that their safety is important and that troops will respect their concerns. Hence the restrictions on tactics that can lead to civilian harm or offense.

In situations where troops are engaged in combat and may be overwhelmed by insurgent attacks (often called "troops in contact" situations), it can be more difficult to balance force protection and civilian protection. The availability of back-up air or artillery support in these situations can be life saving; however, these are also the situations that pose the greatest risk for civilians. In contrast to pre-planned strikes or drone strikes where there is ample time to identify a target, past research suggests that the worst incidents of civilian loss of life tend occur during "troops in contact" situations. In the heat of battle, troops calling in airstrikes often don't know how many civilians might also be lodged inside a compound, or whether a crowd of individuals around a fuel tanker are mostly insurgents or mostly civilians. The immediate threat may be defused, but the short-term gain is at the cost of more enemies and fewer allies in that area for years to come.

Although there's a tension between force protection and civilian protection in these situations, it does not have to be a zero sum game. Not every AK-47 round merits a 500 pound bomb. Rather than ordering strikes on compounds that might house civilians, troops can try ignoring the threat if it seems unlikely to present a serious force risk, retreating to a safe location, or, where necessary, ordering more limited strikes that reducethe risk of harm. Troops in Marjah are trying these and other alternative tactics out right now -- for example, low flyovers and other "scare" tactics rather than outright uses of force. Sure, insurgents will figure out how to take advantage some of these tactics. But tactics and counter-tactics are part of warfare; it's not a challenge unique to counterinsurgency or the current situation in Afghanistan.

Only one week into this operation, and despite significant precautions taken, at least 17 Afghan civilians have been killed. Tens of thousands have been displaced. The devastation from this campaign and from the previous years of isolation, conflict, and neglect will make it difficult for these communities to ever find any sense of normalcy in their lifetimes. Where force protection and population protection will truly meet is when civilian and military officials jointly figure out how to meet these basic humanitarian needs, and stabilize these communities when the fighting has stopped. If not, troops will be right back in Helmand for the 2011 spring offensive. It is this reality that makes bloody battle cries for more airstrikes so dangerously off base: ignoring civilian protection in Helmand won't make troops any safer. It just means they'll be back risking their lives again next year -- just as they have for the last few years.