In the article "Clinton Chides Central Asia on Human Rights," which appeared in the Washington Post on October 23, a senior American official states that he believes that Uzbek strongman Islom Karimov is serious when he says he wants to introduce democratic reforms.

I wonder which of Karimov's actions gives the U.S. government this certainty. You can't find anything to justify it in this year’s State Department human rights report, or the 19 annual reports before it, which classify Karimov as one of the world's most repressive rulers.  Nor is there any evidence in an October 18 letter Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake sent to a coalition of nongovernmental groups protesting the Obama Administration's push for a waiver of congressionally mandated human right conditionality that had prevented the U.S. from providing military assistance to Uzbekistan since 2004.  Blake wrote that the U.S. government does not think Uzbekistan has made "substantial or adequate progress" on human rights.

So why does a senior American official now believe Karimov's pious statements, against all the evidence of the Uzbek dictator's past actions and previous official U.S. statements and reports? Perhaps because the U.S. needs Karimov to keep supplies flowing to Afghanistan?

Against this soaring rhetoric, President Obama’s narrow geographic focus on the Middle East was jarring.  I realize his speech was an effort to reach out to the people in the Middle East and North Africa.  But this is by no means the only region in which people suffer from the problems that have driven the Arab Spring, and about which President Obama spoke so eloquently: problems such as repression, widespread violation of basic human rights, lack of space for economic and political participation by ordinary citizens, corruption, and torture.

Let’s take Central Asia, for example.  Home to two states—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—that are among the most authoritarian in the world, and Kazakhstan, with its one-party parliament and one-man rule.  Yet, particularly as the U.S. relationship with Pakistan deteriorates, U.S. policy towards the region is not driven by a long-term, values-based approach, but by a short-term, geostrategic focus on Afghanistan.

Currently, 60 percent of the supplies that travel overland to U.S. forces in Afghanistan get there via the so-called Northern Distribution Network, which funnels supplies through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  During recent Congressional testimony, senior DOD officials indicated that the goal is to increase that figure to 75 percent.  And that would have to go up again if it becomes impossible to ship via Pakistan.

So here’s another region where the U.S. faces the dilemma President Obama spoke of in his speech: What to do “when our short-term interests don’t align perfectly with our long-term vision”?  To date, U.S. policy has been clear: Afghanistan comes first.  In fact, Afghanistan comes second and third, too.  If the repressive policies of the region’s autocratic leaders create security problems down the road in the shape of popular uprisings or increased support for extremism, or if U.S. cooperation with these despots ruins public attitudes about the U.S., it’s too bad, but it’s an acceptable cost of the war.

Will this change in light of the president’s speech?  Are we really beginning a new chapter in American diplomacy or are we witnessing a bifurcation of American policy: the adoption of a values-based approach where the facts on the ground have forced us in that direction, while maintaining a traditional, short-term, interest-based approach everywhere else?

One year ago today, Evgeniy Zhovtis, Kazakhstan’s best-known human rights defender, was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and sentenced to four years imprisonment.  For many years, Evgeniy was a thorn in the side of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian government, eloquently speaking out at home and abroad about his country’s abysmal human rights record.  Last year, he fell victim to the same kind of abuses from which he had long sought to protect others.

Evgeniy struck a pedestrian who was walking in the middle of an unlit stretch of rural highway at night.  He was not speeding, nor was he drunk.  Renowned Kazakhstani and Russian experts determined that there was no way he could have stopped in time.  But the trial court judge refused to allow them to testify or to consider their evidence, one of the many flagrant violations of Kazakhstan’s own laws that marred the investigation and trial.  In effect, the Kazakhstani system robbed Evgeniy of the right to defend himself.

Then, prison authorities subjected Evgeniy to further discriminatory treatment.  For example, prisoners in the minimum-security facility where he is incarcerated have the right to work on the local economy.  But prison officials denied Evgeniy the right to do so, even though—or, perhaps, especially because—the human rights organization he heads has an office in the town where he could work.

What has happened in the world during the year that Evgeniy has been incarcerated?  Kazakhstan has become chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the organization that made human rights issues a legitimate part of the dialogue on security in Europe.  Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been received in Washington by President Obama while at home he was named “Leader of the Nation,” which will give him significant political power and immunity from prosecution even after he leaves office.  And most recently, the United States and the other 55 OSCE participating states have agreed that Nazarbayev should host the first OSCE summit in more than a decade later this year.

Just a few days ago, the State Department issued a statement commemorating Kazakhstan’s Constitution Day.  In what one can only hope was intentional irony, the statement lauded the democratic tenets of Kazakhstan’s constitution, almost none of which are implemented in practice, and stated that Kazakhstan “will have the opportunity to further underscore your commitment to democratic progress when you welcome the world to the OSCE summit in Astana.”  It seems to me that if the Kazakh authorities have any interest in doing so then the best thing they can do would be to release Evgeniy Zhovtis.

International observers have concluded that the attacks appear to have been carefully orchestrated and involved individuals with access to military and police uniforms and equipment.  The Interim Government in Bishkek charges that they were hired by the family of recently deposed president Kurmanbek Bakiyev.  The Kyrgyz security forces were unable to fully control the situation, and there are disturbing reports that some may even have joined in the violence. 

Many of the 200,000 ethnic Uzbeks who have fled to or across the border with Uzbekistan have no food, water, or shelter. Those remaining in Osh and their Kyrgyz counterparts are short of food, and there are indications that some food aid has been diverted to the black market.

The Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan has already donated medical and food supplies for victims of the violence.  The foundation has released funding for a free hotline for calls from victims that is being operated by a coalition of local NGOs. It has also supported funding for leaflets in Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian urging restraint, and for production of public service TV messages for post-conflict peace building.  The Open Society Institute is preparing an emergency grant to assist in the international humanitarian aid effort, and will also look to monitor the effectiveness of that effort.

The Open Society Institute is calling on the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S., the EU and its member states, and the Russian Federation to provide immediate assistance to ensure effective containment of violence, prevent further clashes, and organize equitable distribution of medical and humanitarian aid to those in need. Once the immediate humanitarian/security crisis has been addressed, the international community should also support a broad, credible, independent investigation into the violence and its origin, and effective post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.

OSI is also concerned that the Interim Government in Bishkek intends to move ahead with a previously scheduled constitutional referendum on June 27.  With international observers unlikely to be deployed in a large part of the country, and large sections of the population unable to vote, we do not believe a referendum would be seen as credible by many within Kyrgyzstan, and thus would not help the Interim Government to establish its legitimacy.  If the Interim Government does go ahead, it will need at the very least to make a major effort to give displaced persons the opportunity to vote.

The overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s corrupt, authoritarian government in early April focused attention on U.S. policy in the country and the rest of Central Asia.  Since 2001, the U.S. Air Force has maintained a key facility at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas airport, through which soldiers transit into and out of Afghanistan.

Last spring, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev threatened to close the base, only to change his mind when the United States agreed to pay more to use it.  Critics argue that concern over the possibility of losing access to Manas caused the Obama Administration to ignore human rights violations, corruption, and bad governance that eventually led to the popular uprising that brought Bakiyev down.

On April 22, the National Security Subcommittee of the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing to look into allegations that the U.S. military contributed to corruption in Kyrgyzstan by signing a contract to buy hundreds of millions of dollars worth of aviation fuel from a company that then subcontracted with firms alleged to have been fronts for Bakiyev’s rapacious son, Maxim.  Last July, Maxim organized his father’s successful re-election campaign.  Put plainly, he was in charge of rigging the election.  As a reward for a job well done, Bakiyev then appointed Maxim to head a new governmental organization called the Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation.

This put Maxim in a position to squeeze a percentage for the family out of virtually every economic activity in the country.  According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, one of the precipitating factors for the uprising was the fact that immediately after drastically raising electricity prices for the country’s largely impoverished population, the government privatized an electrical utility valued at over $130 million to a company controlled by a crony of Maxim’s for the ridiculously low price of $3 million.

Scott Horton, one of the witnesses who testified at the Oversight Committee hearing, noted that officials of the new Kyrygz interim government are unanimous in stating that the United States closed its eyes to corruption and human rights abuses under Bakiyev in order to ensure continued Kyrgyz government permission for the U.S. to maintain the Manas base.  He argued that this policy of doing “sweet deals” from which local political leaders of the day benefit may make the process of procurement and relationship building easier in the short term, but in the longer run impedes the United States’ effort to build a positive relationship with the host country.

Another witness, Professor Alexander Cooley of Barnard College, testified that the Kyrgyz case demonstrates the fallacy of the argument frequently heard in Washington that stability in Central Asia is more important to the U.S. than human rights and good governance.  He noted that American officials came to accept Bakiyev’s authoritarianism as evidence of Kyrgyzstan’s political stability, when in fact the cumulative effects of Bakiyev’s repression and corruption actually destabilized the country and triggered the protests that led to his regime’s sudden demise.

Both Cooley and Horton concluded that the U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan can still be salvaged. This will only be possible, however, if the administration thoroughly investigates existing arrangements, and adopts a new, more transparent approach under which U.S. bases will contribute to the well-being of all the host country’s people, and not just a small circle of leaders, their relatives, and cronies.

As a starting point, the United States needs to ensure transparency regarding the $60 million it pays each year for use of the base, and the more than $200 million it expends each year under the fuel contract.  Until now, that contract has been held by the Mina Corporation, a shadowy outfit with no past history in the fuel supply business.  Kyrgyzstanis – including members of the new interim government – unanimously believe the company was used to funnel money to the Bakiyev family, just as it was used to enrich the family of Bakiyev’s predecessor, Askar Akayev, who was also overthrown by a popular uprising.

The U.S. Department of Defense has just announced that it is canceling the current fuel contract and will soon conduct an open tender to replace it.  This is an encouraging first step, but is not by itself sufficient to undo the damage already done to the U.S. reputation in Kyrgyzstan.

The Department of Defense should require that the new contract be public and completely transparent. Not only should the contract and any subsequent subcontracts be published on the web, but the contractor and any subcontractors should be required to make public their beneficial owners. To ensure transparency, the U.S. government also needs to push the Kyrgyz interim government to be accountable for the money the U.S. pays for use of Manas.  Such an approach might be met with a positive response from the provisional government under newly appointed Interim President Roza Otunbayeva, who is widely respected for placing national interest first.

These steps would help protect the U.S. from charges of fueling local corruption and would demonstrate to the people of Kyrgyzstan that the U.S. supports them and not just whoever is in power.  Given that the Kyrgyz public has brought down two governments in five years, this point might be crucial if the U.S. wants to keep operating the Manas base.

Just a few days before Nazarbayev came to Washington, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court announced—after a long delay—that on April 26 it would decide whether or not to hear an appeal in the case of Evgeniy Zhovtis, the country’s leading human rights activist.  Zhovtis is serving a four-year sentence for vehicular manslaughter.  His defense team and independent observers had catalogued numerous serious violations in the conduct of the investigation, trial, and appeal of his case.

According to McFaul, Obama and Nazarbayev discussed the Zhovtis case and “agreed that we need to try to find a creative solution to solve this very difficult issue.”   Apparently, no one told the Kazakhstani Supreme Court, which just two weeks later decided it would not hear the Zhovtis appeal.  Of course, Kazakhstan’s government will argue that its judiciary is independent and can’t be pressured by the executive branch.

How to respond (politely) to such an assertion?  Well, let’s allow the State Department to do it for us.  In this year’s annual human rights report, the State Department notes that: “The law does not provide for an independent judiciary. The executive branch limited judicial independence…Lack of due process was a problem, particularly in politically motivated trials.”

Having secured a meeting with President Obama in Washington, Nazarbayev still wants the U.S. to agree to Kazakhstan’s proposal to hold an OSCE summit this year in Astana and for Obama to attend.  Washington needs to remember that the overthrow of Kyrgyz ruler Kurmanbek Bakiyev was sparked by public outrage over their leaders’ corruption, bad governance, and human rights violations.  This was accompanied by widespread unhappiness at the failure of the American government to speak out about these glaring problems.  Against this background, can the U.S. really afford to agree to an OSCE summit in Kazakhstan while Evgeniy Zhovtis, an innocent man, sits in prison?

On April 22, the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Oversight Committee held a hearing to look into allegations that the U.S. military contributed to corruption in Kyrgyzstan by signing a contract to buy hundreds of millions of dollars of aviation fuel from a company alleged to have been a front for the son of recently-ousted Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

Scott Horton, a member of the board of OSI’s Central Eurasia Project and Open Society Fellow Alex Cooley both testified at the hearing.  Horton noted that officials of the new Kyrygz interim government are unanimous in stating that the United States closed its eyes to corruption and human rights abuses under Bakiyev in order to ensure continued Kyrgyz government permission for the U.S. to maintain a key base at the Manas airport outside the capital city of Bishkek.  Horton argued that this policy of doing “sweet deals” from which political leaders of the day benefit may make the process of procurement and relationship building easier in the short term, but in the longer run impedes the United States’ effort to build a positive relationship with the host country.

Cooley testified that the Kyrgyz case demonstrates the fallacy of the argument frequently heard in Washington that stability in Central Asia is more important to the U.S. than human rights and good governance.  He noted that American officials came to accept Bakiyev’s authoritarianism as evidence of Kyrgyzstan’s political stability, when in fact the cumulative effects of the regime’s repression and corruption actually destabilized the country and triggered the protests that led to the regime’s sudden demise.

Both Cooley and Horton concluded that the U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan can still be salvaged. This will only be possible, however, if the administration thoroughly investigates existing arrangements, and adopts a new, more transparent approach under which U.S. bases will contribute to the wellbeing of all the host country’s people, and not just a small circle of leaders, their relatives and cronies.

Since elected to serve as the 2010 chair two years ago, Kazakhstan has failed to implement the reform commitments it made to fellow OSCE participating states.  In fact, since 2007 the human rights situation in the country has actually gotten significantly worse.

In a throwback to Soviet practice, in 2007 Kazakhstan became the first country in the post-Soviet space to elect a parliament in which all the seats are held by a single party.  Restrictive laws regulating the Internet and reinforcing privacy protections, criminal trials and civil libel suites have all been used to muzzle what is left of independent media.  Minority religious groups continue to be harassed.  Security services continue to play an outsized role in the life of the country, and Kazakhstan’s best known human rights activist was jailed for four years, convicted of vehicular manslaughter following an investigation and trial, both of which were replete with procedural violations.

The Kazakhs are immensely proud of the fact that they are the first former-Soviet country to chair the OSCE, a point that the official media unceasingly portrays to the domestic audience as a sign of international recognition of the achievements of Kazakhstan and, more specifically, of President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The government of Kazakhstan is making an all-out effort to convince fellow participating states that the OSCE should hold its first summit meeting since 1999, with Nazarbayev presiding.  The Kazakh government is also pressing for a Nazarbayev meeting with President Obama in April, when the Kazakhstani president comes to the U.S. for an international nuclear safety summit.

The Open Society Institute strongly believes that such high-level meetings cannot be successful unless Kazakhstan first takes concrete steps to improve its record on human rights and democracy.   Actions such as releasing high-profile prisoners and amending laws that have been used to muzzle the independent media are important first steps towards reform and demonstrate that the Kazakhstani government is serious about its repeated oral commitments to modernize the country’s political system.