Afghan distrust of international forces runs so deep that many accuse the West of supporting insurgents to justify their continued presence in Afghanistan. Military officials and diplomats cast these allegations aside as conspiracy theories existing on the margins of society, but a new report from the Open Society Foundations found the sentiment is widespread.

The implications are dire. If Afghans don't trust the international community to act in their best interest, how can the international community implement some of its most ambitious strategies that require local cooperation, such as reconciliation, reintegration, and good governance projects?

The report, The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy in Afghanistan, demonstrates the degree to which civilian casualties, wrongful and abusive detention operations, deteriorating security, and a lack of accountability by international forces have eroded Afghan trust. Whereas Westerners regard international forces as protecting Afghans, pushing back insurgents, and fighting terrorism, many Afghans regard international forces as harming civilians, terrorizing local populations through night raids, and creating instability by bankrolling warlords and private militias.

Some of these perceptions are the result of the insurgents' strong propaganda machinery and suspicion of foreigners based on Afghanistan's history of invasion. Even so, many Afghans welcomed the U.S. incursion in 2001. Against a backdrop of high expectations for improvements to their daily lives, their faith was shaken once they saw that foreign military forces were unable to distinguish between the Taliban and civilians; that the international community failed to make good on promises of improving security and governance; their willingness to collude with nefarious characters; and the lack of accountability for detainee abuse and civilian casualties.

Under General Stanley McChrystal, and now under General Petraeus, the military has successfully reduced its civilian casualties; and it's put in place instructions for soldiers to be more sensitive to the rights and customs of Afghans. Detention practices have also improved. But this is just one piece of the military's stability puzzle. Without proper accountability, years of civilian casualties and detainee abuse have left an indelible mark.

Meanwhile civilian casualties caused by insurgents continue to increase; and many Afghans blame their own government and international forces for not finding an end to this. The U.S. also faces criticism for creating a new community policing program called Afghan Local Police. There is a history of similar initiatives that ultimately empower unaccountable and abusive groups and individuals.

All the cumulative disappointment is bad news for an international community that has been struggling unsuccessfully to connect with the Afghan people, stabilize the country, and leave. A woman from Khost, whose views were expressed by many other Afghans, was quoted in the report as stating, "In my opinion, the American forces themselves want to create insurgency for their own interest. Because, if there is peace in the country, then the people will tell them that there is no need for the international forces to stay in the country. That is why they have let the insurgency increase."

After years of blundered wartime detention policy, the U.S. military recently revamped its way of deciding who should be detained and released in Afghanistan.

The new system features Detainee Review Boards (DRBs) where detainees appear before a three-member U.S. military panel that determines whether a detainee should be released, detained until his next review in six months, or transferred to Afghan authorities for prosecution or reconciliation.

In March, I had the opportunity to observe five DRBs. One man was alleged to have distributed landmines and provided financial support to the Taliban. Another was detained after allegedly discarding a hand grenade before approaching a military checkpoint. The third was detained for having in his house materials used for making improvised explosive devices. A fourth had alleged links to insurgent commanders. The fifth detainee was captured along the Pakistan border with a group of insurgents. Each DRB lasted one to three hours.

The DRB panel's decision is based on a "preponderance of information" that is provided by the U.S. military, the detainee, and witnesses. The panel's decision is also based on the likelihood of whether a detainee could be reintegrated back into his community without threatening international or Afghan forces. The five detainees are awaiting the panel's decision.

The DRBs have been moving forward at an impressive pace despite limited number of staff. The military is holding DRBs five days a week. The vast majority of detainees have gone through their first review since the new procedures were implemented in September 2009.

The DRBs are held at the new Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), which currently holds around 800 detainees. DFIP is located on the outskirts of the Bagram Air Base and is under the full control of the U.S. government. It's a $60 million state of the art facility that has replaced the infamous Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which is now taped off and appears empty.

DRBs are an improvement over the past system, Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards (UECRBs), which had been used since 2005 by the U.S. military at Bagram. But the improvements are relative and the bar was set very low to begin with.

In April 2009, Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for D.C., described the UECRBs as "plainly less sophisticated and more error-prone" than the Guantanamo Bay detainee review boards - and those review boards were deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court:

Unlike the [Guantanamo Bay process], where a petitioner has access to a "personal representative," Bagram detainees represent themselves. Obvious obstacles, including language and cultural differences, obstruct effective self-representation by petitioners such as these. Detainees cannot even speak for themselves; they are only permitted to submit a written statement. But in submitting that statement, detainees do not know what evidence the United States relies upon to justify an "enemy combatant" designation -- so they lack a meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence. Respondents' far-reaching and everchanging definition of enemy combatant, coupled with the uncertain evidentiary standards, further undercut the reliability of the UECRB review.

Since that decision, the review procedures in Afghanistan have been overhauled to the DRB system. It remains to be seen, however, whether the U.S. has the right combination of procedures to build a fair process that can make an accurate determination relating to a person's detention and freedom.

The rights of the detainee are outlined at the beginning of the hearing when the military panel states, directly and simply: "This is not a criminal trial." The implication is that the detainee won't be convicted of a crime and that the military won't apply many of the essential legal rights found in criminal proceedings in most countries around the world. The detainee isn't entitled to a lawyer and isn't allowed to see all the evidence against him. Evidentiary standards are informal and the detainee's fate is not decided by an independent judge but by a member of the U.S. military--the same institution that detained him.

While the rules are a far cry from the regular system of courtroom checks and balances, the military has tried to address shortcomings by providing detainees with certain rights that were never part of the UECRB in Bagram.

Each detainee is assigned a personal representative--not a lawyer--who can review the classified evidence on their behalf. (The detainee can't review classified evidence.) Detainees are informed of the allegations against them and can, also for the first time, call witnesses to testify on their behalf. DRB policy also explicitly prohibits information obtained under torture from being submitted as evidence.

To increase the presence of witnesses at the DRBs, the U.S. military distributes information in local communities about the DRB procedures. The U.S. also allows detainees to ask their relatives to gather witnesses and documents to support their case. Both of these measures are positive since some former detainees I spoke with complained that they were not notified of their right to call witnesses.

Four of the five DRBs I observed included witnesses, some of whom disputed the government's allegations and others who acted as character witnesses. When the panel asked the witnesses what would happen if the detainee were released, local community elders frequently assured the panel that they would not pose a threat and would be able to find gainful employment.

In the DRB's that I observed, the personal representatives, who according to the DRB policy are obligated to act in the "best interest" of the detainee, felt free to advocate on behalf of a detainee, challenge the factual record, and ensure that the detainee understood the procedures. This is a welcomed change.

However, there are reasons for concern. Serious problems continue to damage the credibility of the new system.

For example, that detainees are not allowed to review classified information seriously jeopardizes the accuracy and legitimacy of the hearings. This classification procedure, though important for protecting identities of informants, makes it nearly impossible for the detainee to effectively challenge the veracity of the allegations.

To solve this problem, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies need to end their culture of over-classification and give greater priority to improving their evidence gathering capacity, as opposed to their intelligence gathering capacity. Without a shift from reliance on secret sources to greater transparency, U.S. detention operations and its detainee review system are doomed. This is not unprecedented; International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) soldiers, who send their detainees to Afghan authorities, have been given orders to improve evidence collection for Afghan criminal prosecutions.

The U.S. also needs to review its intelligence sources and eliminate those who repeatedly provide false and inaccurate information. One of the biggest complaints Afghans have of the U.S. detention policy is that informants aren't held accountable. In the highly publicized botched night raid by U.S. Special Operations Forces that killed civilians in February, the Christian Science Monitor reported the family as saying, "We want that spy who gave the false information to the Americans...I don't want the spy for myself, I want him to face justice or be handed over to the commander of the [Afghan army] corps."

The DRBs also need more staff, especially personal representatives. If not supplemented, personnel will quickly burn-out and this will severely damage the quality of the DRBs. Currently, there are only eight representatives responsible for reviewing evidence, gathering witnesses, and conducting meetings for 800 detainees.

Also of grave concern is the lack of adequate translation services during DRB proceedings. In the cases I observed, the interpreter at times did not provide a full translation of comments by detainees, witnesses, panel members, personal representatives, or the recorder. Inadequate interpreters should not be allowed to influence a process that determines a person's liberty. Since the DRBs are audio recorded, it would be beneficial for an independent expert to review the tapes and assess the quality of the DRB interpreters. More broadly, U.S. military should conduct a complete review of its Dari and Pashtu interpreters.

Another key problem is that U.S. military personnel aren't well versed in Afghan history, culture, and politics, which is critical in accurate detainee reviews. Mobile ringtones that demonstrate sympathy for the Taliban (yes, they exist); hosting a wedding that Taliban members attend; and an affiliation with an insurgent commander aren't necessarily incriminating in an Afghan context, however are seen as very worrisome behavior by the U.S. military. In the realities of this conflict, Afghans download Taliban ring tones to help them gain safe passage at insurgent checkpoints; insurgents are omnipresent in local community affairs; and insurgent commanders today have been U.S. allies in the past.

To help resolve this problem, U.S. military personnel, especially those involved in detentions, should receive better training on Afghanistan's history, culture, and politics. Afghan legal expertise would also be valuable since the DRB panel, whose members aren't experts in Afghan law, can hand over detainees to Afghan authorities for criminal prosecutions.

Despite all the changes to its detention policies, and the improvements that are still needed, the U.S. remains adamant about handing its DFIP operations to the Afghan government, at which point the Afghan government is likely to start holding criminal trials for the detainees. The transfer date is ambitiously set for January 2011. In reality, it will take place when the U.S. is confident that Afghanistan's justice system is stronger and safe from threats of corruption.

To quicken the pace, the U.S. is setting up a Rule of Law Center at DFIP where it will facilitate the training of Afghan judges, national security prosecutors, investigators, and defense lawyers under Afghan domestic law. If done well, this rule of law program holds considerable potential for strengthening Afghanistan's extremely weak legal system. Afghan officials desperately need to increase their skills in building legal cases and respecting the rights of detainees, such as by respecting the ban on coerced evidence and ensuring detainees enjoy their right to an attorney and fair trial.

As the U.S. moves forward in its various efforts to change the way it conducts detention operations in Afghanistan, it remains unwilling to allow defense lawyers into the DRBs, put non-military personnel on the review panel, or permit detainees to see classified evidence. All weaken the ability of the military to accurately determine who it should detainee and who it should set free.

But these flaws shouldn't cloud the fact that some of the other problem areas can be fixed if tackled appropriately, such as through better evidence collection, not classifying information unnecessarily, improving interpreters, increasing the number of personal representatives, and proper rule of law training for national security detention cases.

Yesterday, the leader of international military forces in Afghanistan announced changes to the way his forces conduct war. Days after the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke about the need to reduce Afghan resentment and ill-will towards the U.S. military, General McChrystal made public a new tactical directive ordering that "night raids must be tactically sound, judiciously used, and as transparent as possible."

This is a smart move. It heeds the concerns of Afghans and closely tracks the findings of a recent report, which I co-authored, released by the Open Society Institute and The Liaison Office (TLO), an Afghan nongovernmental organization.

As I wrote in my post last week: "While it may be necessary for forces to conduct night raids in certain scenarios, military planners need to do a better job at preventing the mistakes that too often accompany the raids." These mistakes include abusive behavior, destruction of property, the disrespect of cultural norms, and lack of accountability.

Because compounds frequently house dozens of people, most of whom are not the targets of the raids, residents complain that the destruction of property is often needless and avoidable.

As a result, night raids have been counterproductive to some of the top goals the international community has set out to achieve in Afghanistan, namely increasing stability, garnering greater local trust and support, and strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan.

As the OSI-TLO report mentions, night raids are even overshadowing the military's pro-civilian successes, such as the reduction of airstrikes that kill innocent men, women, and children.

The new order addresses some of these issues. Soldiers are to use night raids only as a last resort and when they provide an advantage over day-time operations. The directive also indicates that forces who conduct raids should be accountable and not rely on secrecy and deniability. This is in direct response to Afghan complaints about the lack of answers, especially from operations run by Special Operations Forces, about the destruction of their property or the detainment of a relative.

McChrystal goes as far as to instruct: "If possible, local elders should be incorporated into the process to ensure that the actual facts are related to the local populace." In other words, soldiers should now understand that their actions will need to be explained, and justified, to the Afghan people.

The increased importance McChrystal places on accountability is also revealed by the directive's requirements for soldiers to take record of any seized or damaged property and to provide "detailed receipts with point-of-contact provided to local elders or other leaders within the compound, and in the case of any damage, instructions on how to claim compensation."

The new directive also, importantly, requires that females caught in night raids be searched only by females and emphasizes the importance of international forces to conduct operations in coordination with Afghan national security forces. "ANSF should be the first force seen and the first voices heard by the occupants of any compound entered," the directive reads. Both of these measures combat Afghan complaints of cultural insensitivities by international forces.

The directive does, however, fall short on a few critical issues:

1. The directive minimizes the real problems that night raids cause for Afghans and, instead, focuses on the negative perceptions night raids create through "myths, distortions and propaganda." While it is true that minor incidents can snowball into hyperbole, the destruction of furniture, clothes, and vehicles, prolonged detention, and physical and verbal abuse are very real, justified complaints.
2. Nothing in the directive instructs forces to improve how they verify their intelligence and gather evidence. My only hope is that this is in the classified version or in another classified directive. The fact that McChrystal expects his soldiers to take records of confiscated and damaged property does, however, help debunk the myth that night raids are chaotic and violent events that make it impossible for the military to gather detailed witness statements and evidence that could be used to strengthen judicial or administrative proceeding. The fact is that a raid, which often starts off crazed, will often become calm and controlled.
3. The increased responsibilities that the directive gives to Afghan forces in night raids needs to be matched with an increased level of accountability for Afghan forces. Afghan security forces have a reputation for corruption and even torture. If international forces see such abuse, a procedure needs be in place that guarantees the guilty individuals will be held responsible and such behavior will not reoccur.
4. The directive does not prohibit international forces from working with informal unregulated Afghan militias, often called campaign forces, that fall outside the control of the Afghan government. This is a recipe for disaster. These groups are difficult to monitor and have a reputation for abuse. As one former detainee told me, "The actions of these campaigns are defaming American soldiers."

In the coming weeks and months, as military operations continue to expand into some of the country's most violent areas, international forces and Afghan forces will be under the close scrutiny of local communities and human rights groups. The new directive is a positive step towards ensuring that civilians don't get caught in the middle of a war. But the true test will be measured by the implementation of the directive, the behavior of those forces not covered by its rules, and General McChrystal's continued willingness to make corrections as needed.

While international forces in Afghanistan have killed fewer civilians in 2009 than in previous years many Afghans still feel abused and angry. One of the main reasons is night raids.

The military insists that conducting operations at night is necessary because it gives them the element of surprise. Afghans say it increases the chance for confusion, chaos, abuse, destruction, civilian casualties, and community fury.

In July 2009, the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), General McChrystal, issued a "tactical directive" instructing soldiers to "account for the unique sensitivities toward local women" and to conduct raids in cooperation with Afghan forces. These were positive changes that addressed some of the local concerns, but a new study conducted by the Open Society Institute and an Afghan nongovernmental organization, The Liaison Office (TLO), demonstrates that more reforms are needed.

Night raids are characterized by international forces as breaking into a house in the dark of night, often in concert with Afghan forces, to search the premises and detain individuals. Along the way, soldiers have been accused of engaging in abusive behavior, destroying property, and disrespecting cultural norms. In some cases, Afghans say soldiers gun-butted or kicked their captives, sometimes while handcuffed. Because many compounds house dozens of people, residents in the house who are not the target of the raids complain that this destruction of property is often needless and avoidable.

As the report points out, informants continue to settle their personal rivalries by feeding false intelligence to international forces, who then conduct operations that result in wrongful detentions, or even death. International forces also continue to work with unaccountable and abusive Afghan militia groups (also known as "campaign forces") during highly covert operations. Despite handing over many detainees to the Afghan criminal justice system, international forces often fail to properly gather evidence and collect information that could be used at a trial.

The result: Those who pose a serious security threat may not be able to be prosecuted due to a lack of valuable evidence or can bribe their way to freedom. And, those who are poor and innocent may face being convicted in unfair trials.

With all these problems and more, the study concludes that night raids remain counterproductive to some of the top goals the international community has set out to achieve in Afghanistan, namely increasing stability, garnering greater local trust and support, and strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan. Night raids, the report said, are even overshadowing the military's pro-civilian successes, such as the reduction of airstrikes that kill innocent men, women, and children.

While it may be necessary for forces to conduct night raids in certain scenarios, military planners need to do a better job at preventing the mistakes that too often accompany the raids. The OSI-TLO study, which was based on information compiled from 20 focus group discussions and more than 25 in-depth interviews in the conflict-prone provinces of Gardez and Paktia, provides six key recommendations:

1. Find alternatives to night raids wherever possible: While attacking homes at night and detaining suspects may add the element of surprise and reduce the risk to pro-government forces, the way these raids are currently carried out, dramatically increased the chances of indiscriminate use of force against innocent women, children, and men in the house.
2. Coordinate night raids with local International Security Assistance Force commanders: Night raids can generate enormous hostility among local populations, in one stroke undoing months of counterinsurgency efforts by the local commander. Yet because so many night raids are carried out by Special Operations Forces, local commanders often complain that they do not even know when raids are conducted in their own area of operations. Better coordination will help to protect these gains and reduce the negative consequences of poorly planned raids.
3. Guard against misinformation: In a society as fragmented by ethnic and tribal lines as Afghanistan, it is paramount that military actors triangulate information more rigorously using a larger number and a more diverse body of local sources, including the Afghan government. It is equally important that international forces thoroughly record and collect evidence when conducting night raids or other search and seizure operations. Doing so will increase the accuracy and credibility of subsequent legal proceedings.
4. Ensure that greater Afghan involvement is not a blank check: While expanding Afghan involvement and leadership in the authorization and operation of night raids is a significant improvement, and one that communities generally endorse, it is not a panacea to reducing grievances against international forces. For most Afghans, international forces are guilty by association if they do not prevent accompanying Afghan forces from behaving poorly or breaking the law. It is therefore necessary that Afghan National Security Forces are held accountable for abuses and trained not to repeat the mistakes of international forces.
5. Avoid working with unregulated militia: Working with "campaign forces" that fall outside the official Afghan government security apparatus is a recipe for disaster. These groups are difficult to monitor and have a reputation for abuse. Research shows that Afghans prefer to encounter security forces they can link to a government body that holds them accountable, even if only marginally so. At least they know who to complain to, or in theory who should be accountable.
6. Restore confidence through greater accountability: Improving accountability would be a key confidence-building measure. Specific changes might include: being more transparent about night raids, at least after the fact if not before; holding Afghan counterparts accountable; and communicating to affected communities when and how any misconduct is addressed. Providing apologies and, where appropriate, compensation to innocent families who are mistakenly targeted may also mitigate community anger after an incident, and improve the perception of accountability.

To facilitate this, international forces should establish a mechanism to receive and respond to complaints and inquiries regarding night raids and to enforce remedies where valid. For it to be effective, this mechanism must be accessible to Afghan communities and provide relevant information about the operations in question. The mechanism should have access to relevant information about the night raids, including a pre-raid written justification for the raid why it needs to be conducted at night-time instead of the day. For purposes of accountability, each raid should also be approved in writing by an appropriate military official.