They are in their early twenties, wear baggy clothes, and have unruly hair at times hidden under distinctive woolen hats—a far cry from the series of diplomats, politicians, analysts, and religious authorities our delegation met in September as part of a visit to Senegal to investigate the political landscape ahead of next year’s elections. This group of less-traditional interlocutors is inspired by Senegal’s hip-hop and rap artists and is bent on preventing their President from “manipulating the constitution and presenting a third, unconstitutional candidature.” They are also actively promoting civic education through their music.

The severity of their message belies the common image of Senegal, a country known for its beaches, comparatively well developed infrastructure, the harmonious coexistence of religious and linguistic groups, and a tradition of democratic elections held regularly since it gained independence fromFrance in 1960. This is the image that makes it a “donor darling” and a driver of change in West Africa, a region otherwise characterised by unconstitutional changes of power (euphemism for repeated coup d’état), massacres, and endemic poverty amidst an abundance of natural resources.

It is also a country where a majority of the population of just over 12.5 million is under 25. In electoral terms this equals more than a million new voters since the 2007 elections and a youth vote that could tip the scale in the ballots scheduled for the end of February 2012. President Abdoulaye Wade is all too aware of this nascent political force.

The Socialist Party’s 40-year domination came to an end in March 2000, when Wade, the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), won the presidency. One year later, free and fair legislative elections conferred a parliamentary majority to the President’s coalition. The 2007 presidential and legislative elections, facilitated by an opposition boycott, maintained the configuration. However the government’s inability to deliver and the deteriorating socio-economic situation resulted in the opposition making substantial gains in nationwide local elections in 2009.

During his tenure Wade has worked tirelessly to turn Senegalinto a “family-run patrimonial state.” To preserve it, he has tried to change the constitution twice and intends to run for president in 2012, when he will be 84. Opinions differ on whether the constitution allows him to do so, and the final verdict on his eligibility rests with the Constitutional Council. Their decision is due only one month ahead of the elections. In the meantime, the opposition has become polarized and divided: several opposition platforms exist, testimony to Senegal’s rich political participation and civil society activism, but they are unable to come forward with a unified agenda, let alone agree on a common candidate.

Challenging commonly held assumptions about the country and highlighting the dangers of democratic relapse, is not an easy task. Power squabbles have intensified and have taken on life-or-death importance. There is a dearth of practical solutions to unavoidable yet predictable problems.

Take rainfall for example. In August 2009, 360,000 people were affected by country-wide floods. The lack of a functioning drainage system largely contributed to the catastrophic results. Since then there has been no progress and thousands of families were displaced during the storms this year. Electricity is another issue; Senegalese experience daily power-cuts that last for hours due to a deteriorating infrastructure that needs investment—a costly undertaking. The economy remains stagnant but no structural policies have been set in place to diversify agricultural production. Security in the Casamance region, where a separatist movement has been active since the early 1980s, is fragile at best. A peace agreement signed in 2004 after 20 years of rebel activities has only resulted in conflict limbo: no war but no peace either.

More importantly, the political culture developed in Senegal through decades of peaceful interreligious cohabitation, media freedom, high levels of education, and a vibrant and well organized civil society seems to have been weakened under Wade’s presidency. The spirit of a recent law on decentralization appears to have been ignored as the government has reconfigured electoral districts and replaced locally elected authorities with nominated officials. The distribution of electoral cards is contingent upon receiving an identity card and there is a strong suspicion that administrative impediments are set in place to delay their delivery. Voters’ registration is slow, more difficult in remote areas, and opposition parties often do not have the means to reach their constituencies or be present at registration. Organizational chaos is threatening the legitimacy of the elections and undermining the opposition’s confidence in the possibility to win free and fair elections. To make matters worse, media harassment has increased.

Senegal’s long-standing relations with donors make their engagement of paramount importance. The U.S., Switzerland, Canada, the United Nations, the European Union, Germany, and some private foundations have been actively engaged monitoring the electoral process and ensuring implementation of corrective measures. The government has yet to pronounce itself clearly on international election monitoring: declarations by official representatives seem to indicate some openness to the idea whilst official invitations have yet to be issued.

Senegal’s largely democratic and peaceful trajectory is an extraordinary achievement that sets it ahead of many African countries. This legacy is at risk of being lost under political imbroglios. It is in the best interest of Senegal, the entire region, and of the donor community, that the country’s positive inheritance reaches the next generation.

Underneath their baggy pants and woollen hats, the youth may not have all the answers, but they are key to the future.

The 2006 constitution states that the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo is directly elected to a five-year term, renewable once, by universal suffrage. Elections must be organized 90 days before the swearing in of the president in early December.

But so far the road to these elections has been a bumpy one. The voters list has yet to be completed; both donors and government are holding back on their pledges to meet the required budget; the composition of the electoral commission, the national body set up to organize and monitor the elections,  has been marred by bitter struggles between the majority and the opposition and does not include civil society representatives; the definition of the electoral calendar has been problematic. There are also already concerns about the impartiality of the commission with questions raised as to who is effectively funding it.

At the beginning of 2011 the Congolese national assembly approved constitutional amendments that eliminate the multi-round run-off vote system used during the 2006 elections. Under the new procedure, the candidate with the largest percentage of votes wins the seat even if the total votes amount to less than 50 percent of the electorate. The result is that a president could be appointed that has been favored by less than 50 percent of the votes cast with aberrant consequences on the “representativeness” of the highest post in the country. The revision has been strongly contested by the opposition, human rights defenders, and civil society. It has also reinforced the “Congo fatigue” within the international donor community.

The government has justified the move by saying that two rounds of elections would cost more than one, but the flip side is that a one-round electoral process is more likely to result in victory by reducing the potential for opposition to organize effectively.

The European Parliament is opposed to an EU international monitoring mission in the DRC for fears that this would represent an implicit endorsement of the controversial, constitutional amendment. European Parliamentarians have also voiced concern over a lack of progress in democratization since 2006 in addition to financial constraints and EU institutional matters.

One wonders, however, how this situation is any different to other countries where the EU has recently monitored equally flawed election processes, namely in Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria.

Given its emphasis on democracy and good governance, and its sustained presence (albeit with a mixed record) in the DRC, the EU has no excuse to stand idle during elections in Congo. What is needed is a genuine commitment resulting in policy towards Congo that puts democratic progress at the heart of EU’s engagement.

What’s more, an international presence, may be the only possibility for the Congolese to have a frank account of their elections. This in turn may help prevent social unrest and political disputes over end results.

Engagement in election monitoring in the DRC is the only way that the EU can claim any political role in the aftermath of the elections: just imagine if the EU had not participated in election monitoring in Sudan. Would it be now in a position to stand alongside other international actors in influencing local political leaders? What would it signal with regard to EU financed programs in support of civil society, media freedom, good governance, and rule of law in the DRC?

Local civil society finds itself more isolated now than in 2006 when the international community rushed to assist Congo’s first peaceful and democratic election. It stands alone to organize civic education programs, establish platforms, stand up to government, reach out to partners and eventually, monitor the elections. All this while wondering how five years in government were not enough to organize the elections in due time.

The European Union, together with other donors, has an opportunity to be a genuine partner to Congolese civil society and political development as the country yet-to-be-realized multiparty democracy engages in its second test. This means being able to stay engaged in the whole electoral process (rather than just the moment of elections), be prepared to deliver unpalatable messages and follow them up with real commitments.